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Questions regarding whether, and if so, under what conditions, groups ex-
hibit “crowd wisdom” have spurred numerous studies in many disciplines, in-
cluding management and organizational science, psychology, sociology, com-
plex systems, and computer science. Substantial effort in previous research
on these questions has focused on investigating the role of social influence in
promoting the wisdom of the crowd or, conversely, leading the crowd astray.
Specifically, many previous studies have sought to infer the importance of so-
cial influence network attributes (such as influence centralization) to explain
the accuracy of collective estimates. In this paper, we argue that this approach
is limited and can lead to inconsistent conclusions. Based on our theoretical
analysis, numerical simulation, and reanalysis of four previously published
experiments (which included a total of 4,002 human participants, organized in
131 independent groups), we demonstrate that the wisdom of crowds in esti-
mation tasks depends on the interaction between the following two factors: (i)
centralization of the social influence network, and (ii) the features of the es-
timation context—i.e., the distribution of the initial (pre-influence) estimates.
Specifically, we find that centralized influence is desirable in situations where
a crowd is predisposed to overestimation bias and/or have a high likelihood of
committing egregious errors. By adopting a framework that integrates both
the structure of social influence and the estimation context, we bring the pre-
viously conflicting results under one theoretical framework, and clarify the
effects of influence centralization on the quality of crowd wisdom.
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In its classical definition, the concept of “the wisdom of crowds” refers to the idea that the
aggregate estimate of a group of individuals can be superior to that of individual, credentialed
experts [1, 2]. Recent applications of this concept include technological, political, and eco-
nomic forecasting [3], crowdsourcing [4], and public policy design [5]. Conventional statistical
accounts of the wisdom of crowds rely on the following two assumptions: (i) that individuals’
errors are independent (uncorrelated), and (ii) that the individuals are unbiased (correct) in mean
expectations [2]. However, social influence has been widely reported to increase the similarity
of individuals’ judgment in estimation tasks [6, 7, 8, 9] and, additionally, the distribution of the
initial (pre-influence) estimates can be systematically biased [10, 11].
Previous research has yielded conflicting findings on the consequences of violating the in-
dependence and collective unbiasedness assumptions. For instance, despite the evidence that
social influence can significantly benefit group and individual estimates [8, 12, 13, 14, 15], so-
cial influence has also been found to lead group estimates astray by inducing social bias, herd-
ing, and groupthink [6, 7]. In response to this inconsistency in findings, notable reconciliation
efforts have focused on investigating how social network theories interact with the process of
collective belief formation. The results of these efforts, including a seminal theoretical work [9]
and laboratory experiments [8], have established that decentralized influence structures—i.e.,
structures where everyone has an equal voice, as opposed to centralized structures where several
individuals have disproportionate influence—are the underlying mechanism for preserving the
wisdom of crowds in estimation tasks.
While these results might appear to broadly suggest the superiority of decentralized influ-
ence networks in promoting the wisdom of crowds, this conclusion is based on the assump-
tion that the benefit of influence decentralization is identical across all estimation tasks. How-
ever, relevant research on collective problem solving has demonstrated that variation in task
features—such as task complexity [13, 16, 17]—can fundamentally alter group dynamics and
outcomes. Therefore, the role of the interaction structure cannot be decoupled from the context
of the task.
In this study, we explore the basic question of whether centralized influence structures im-
prove or hinder the wisdom of crowds in estimation tasks. Our results demonstrate that these
effects systematically vary with the estimation context (i.e., the distribution of the initial es-
timates) and, therefore, are more heterogeneous than previously suggested. Specifically, we
find that centralized influence structures outperform decentralized structures in the estimation
contexts where a group of individuals tends to be systematically biased, or is highly likely to
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commit egregious errors.
To illustrate this, let us consider a group of n agents tasked to maximally accurately esti-
mate or forecast some unknown positive quantity such as the unemployment rate next quarter,
life expectancy of an ill patient, amount of calories in a meal, prevalence of global influenza
infections in two weeks, or the number of jellybeans in a jar. Although optimal planning de-
pends on the accuracy of the estimate, agents can be systematically biased (i.e., tend to over-
or underestimate the actual value). The causes of systematic bias, µ, can include the following
factors: disproportionate exposure to a skewed sample of task types [18, 19], nonlinear rela-
tionship between subjective perceptions and actual magnitude of a physical stimulus [20], or
the tendency to over-attend to the information that supports one’s hypotheses [21].
Additionally, empirical distributions of numerical estimates tend to be right-skewed with
excess kurtosis (where most estimates are low, with a minority falling on a fat right tail) [7, 10,
22]. The dispersion and level of skewness of the distribution tail, σ, can emerge due to several
possibly interdependent explanations. One of such explanations is the level of demonstrability
of the estimation task, which is directly related to the amount and heterogeneity of the agents’
prior information about the quantity to be estimated (due to expertise, uncertainty, knowledge,
or simply disposition). The lower the demonstrability of the quantity, the wider the range of
estimates that would seem reasonable to the agents [23]. For instance, while an estimate of
three orders of magnitude from the true value would seem absurd if one considers the age
of death of a celebrity, such an estimate would appear more plausible if one guesses the life
expectancy of an ill patient (or the number of stars in the universe).
In general, the extent of systematic bias, µ, and dispersion, σ, of the initial estimates can be
viewed as an intrinsic property of the estimation context: a population of agents performing a
particular estimation task. Of note, different populations of agents (e.g., experts vs. novices)
might have different biases and dispersion for similar tasks. Conversely, the same population
can vary in terms of their bias and dispersion across different types of tasks. Figure 1.A shows
four estimation contexts with varying levels of bias and dispersion.
To model the population of the agents performing a particular estimation task, we endow
each agent with a biased and noisy signal about the truth that constitutes her initial estimate.
The initial estimates are independent and identically distributed with the location parameter µ,
which indicates the center of the distribution that biases the estimates with respect to the truth,
and the shape parameter σ, which determines the variation and tail-shape.
Agents frequently have access to the opinions or estimates of other agents. In many common
3
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the components of the estimation context and social
influence framework. Panel A illustrates four types of estimation contexts by varying the dis-
tribution of the initial estimates. Panel B provides examples of different influence structures
arranged in the order of increasing centralization—from a fully decentralized structure, where
everyone has an equal voice, to a highly centralized structure, where there is one highly influ-
ential individual.
models of social influence [24, 25], as well as in other aggregation mechanisms [26, 27], the
collective estimate of the group can be expressed as a linear combination of the initial estimates.
This definition of collective estimates contains the simple average of the initial estimates as a
special case (i.e., the typical “wisdom of crowds”).
We introduce a centralization parameter, ω, to interpolate between a collective estimate
produced by a fully decentralized influence setup where every agent has an equal voice, ω = 0,
and a dictatorial setup with a single influential agent, ω = 1 (see Materials and Methods). Our
definition of ω coincides with Freedman’s centralization [28] for a class of social influence
networks. Freedman’s centralization measures the extent to which a whole group of agents
has a centralized structure. Figure 1.B shows four influence network structures in this class
(see SI section S1.1 for the calculation of ω for different networks). We measure the collective
performance of the agents in terms of the proximity of the collective estimate to the true value
of the estimated quantity. Specifically, we compute the probability that the collective estimate
produced by a centralized influence structure outperforms a decentralized baseline. We denote
this probability by Ωn. Of note, Ωn captures a critical feature of the estimation context—
namely, the suitability of the estimation context to benefit from centralization. In particular,
when Ωn < 1/2, the initial estimates are better suited for decentralized influence structures;
conversely, when Ωn > 1/2, they are better suited for centralized influence structures.
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In this theoretical model, we give a lower bound on Ωn as a function of the estimation con-
text (i.e., the distribution of the initial estimates), and the network structure (see Materials and
Methods). For heavy-tailed distributions (e.g., Pareto, log-normal, log-Laplace), we identify
phase transition behaviors, whereby the limiting value of the lower bound transitions from 0
(decentralized performs better) to 1/2 or 1 (centralized performs better) as the distribution pa-
rameter, σ, crosses a critical value (see SI section S2.1). Subsequently, for heavy-tailed distribu-
tions, we show that the performance of the collective estimate in a centralized structure where a
single agent has a non-vanishing influence (i.e., her contribution to the collective estimate does
not become negligible as n→∞) can be superior to that of the decentralized baseline. Of note,
in this model, a centralized structure violates the vanishing influence condition for the wisdom
of crowds [9, Proposition 2]. This underscores the importance of the distributional assump-
tions, which are context-dependent, when studying the effect of social influence on the wisdom
of crowds.
In Figure 2, we consider a log-normal distribution for the initial estimates, as reported in
several empirical studies [7, 8, 22]. In this case, the model predicts that centralized influence
structures improve collective estimates over decentralized influence structures where the distri-
bution of the initial estimates is characterized by an overestimation bias (see SI section S2.2.1
and Figure S2 for the effect of the systematic bias) and/or large dispersion. However, this
relationship gets reversed when the distribution is characterized by low dispersion and under-
estimation bias. Figure 2 shows the regions of the parameter space where centralized influence
structures have a higher likelihood of outperforming decentralized structures (see SI section S2
and Figure S1 for simulation details and other distributional classes).
In order to empirically illustrate the explanatory power of this approach, we use the data
from four published experiments [7, 8, 13, 14]. In these experiments, a total of 4,002 partici-
pants, organized into 131 independent groups, completed a total of 57 estimation tasks, and a
total of 20,030 individual estimations and 815 collective estimations were generated (see Fig-
ure 3.A). Each task constitutes an estimation context in our framework and, therefore, we have
a total of 57 estimation contexts.
All experiments followed a similar procedure that involved the following three steps: (1) the
participants simultaneously and independently completed numeric estimation tasks on a range
of topics (e.g., visual estimation, trivia questions, political facts, economic forecasts); (2) the
participants in the social interaction condition communicated information about their estimates
with each other; and (3) the participants had one or more opportunities to revise their estimates.
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Figure 2: Simulated phase diagram illustrating the link between the distribution of the
initial estimates, network structure, and collective performance. Our proposed feature of
the estimation context, Ωn, is the probability that the collective performance of a group of agents
organized in a centralized influence structure (ω > 0) will be superior to that of a decentralized
structure (ω = 0) as a function of the systematic bias (µ; the tendency for overestimation, µ > 0
or underestimation, µ < 0) and dispersion (σ; the likelihood of committing an egregious error).
The initial estimates are sampled from a log-normal distribution for a fixed number of agents
(n = 50) and centralization level (ω = 1/3). See SI Figures S1 and S3 for other distributions
and parameter choices.
One trial consisted of a single group answering a single task.
For each estimation context, based on the empirical initial estimates, without the need for
making any distributional assumptions, we compute our proposed feature, Ω, directly from the
data (see SI section S3). Figure 3.B shows the distribution of Ω in these studies. For each
trial, we measure the accuracy of the collective initial and the collective revised final estimate.
We measure accuracy as the distance to the correct answer—i.e., the absolute value of the
difference between the true value and the collective estimate. The following two main outcome
metrics are used: (1) the standardized (z-score) absolute error of the revised collective estimate
(i.e., groups with social interaction vs. groups without social interaction) and (2) whether the
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collective estimate becomes more accurate than the initial estimate after social interaction (i.e.,
groups with social interaction).
Our empirical analysis relies on the fact that the collective initial estimate is equivalent to the
most decentralized influence structure (i.e., ω = 0); then, social interaction can only increase
the influence centralization (i.e., ω > 0). That is, even in social interactions where everybody is
equally connected in terms of communication structure, some group members may still become
more influential than others in terms of determining the collective outcome. This superiority
of some individuals’ influence can be underpinned by virtue of those individuals being more
talkative, more persuasive, or more resistant to social influence [8, 15].
We begin by testing the main effect predicted by our theory—namely, that the effect of
social influence centralization on the performance of groups is moderated by the estimation
context (i.e., the distribution of the initial estimates). As shown in Figure 3.C, we find that
the interaction between the centralization of the influence and the estimation context feature,
Ω, significantly affects the wisdom of crowds (β = −3.88; t-statistic = −7.20; p < 0.001).
Critically, the results of this analysis show that variation in the estimation context feature, Ω,
can completely reverse the effects of social influence centralization: specifically, when Ω < 1/2,
the collective error is lower in decentralized influence structures; furthermore, when Ω > 1/2,
collective estimates produced by the groups in centralized structures perform better.
To find further support to this finding, we limit our attention to the groups in the centralized
influence conditions. As shown in Figure 3.D, we find that whether a group improved after
social interaction is substantially explained by our proposed feature of the estimation context,
Ω (odds ratio = 15.00; z-statistic = 5.66; p < 0.001).
The critical implication of the above results is that some features of the estimation context
(such as our proposed Ω) moderate the effect of influence centralization. Therefore, we find
no support to the hypothesis that decentralized influence structures would be preferred over
centralized ones, independently of the estimation context.
Therefore, the effect of network structure on the collective estimation performance should
be re-conceptualized under a context-dependent framework (i.e., with respect to the population
of individuals performing the particular task). There is no single influence structure that is
better than others in all situations. Such a context-dependent framework can unify previously
conflicting findings on crowd wisdom, under a single, theoretical framework; and explain the
effects of the influence network structure on the quality of the collective estimates.
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Figure 3: Reanalysis of previously published experiments. Panel A shows the number of
participants, groups, tasks, and trials in the reanalyzed experiments. Panel B displays the dis-
tribution of the estimation context feature, Ω, across these studies. Panel C shows the marginal
effect of the interaction term between influence centralization and the estimation context fea-
ture, Ω. Panel D shows the probability that the groups improve their performance after social
interaction as a function of the feature of the estimation context, Ω.
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Admittedly, the estimation context is only one of several potential sources of inconsisten-
cies in previous studies. For instance, vagueness or ambiguity of some theoretical constructs
(e.g., influence) can result in different studies investigating seemingly the same phenomenon,
to measure different things. Furthermore, we also acknowledge that our proposed feature of the
estimation context, Ωn, is concerned only with the probability of the following event: the collec-
tive estimate generated by the agents interacting in a centralized influence structure is closer to
the truth, than the collective estimate generated by the agents in a decentralized structure. This
is not the same as comparing the expected loss or error magnitude of these collective estimates
(unless the loss is a Heaviside function, i.e., a yes/no type of payoff; see Figure S4 for examples
of other loss functions).
Our theoretical and empirical exercise has demonstrated that conclusions about the role of
the social influence network can be inconsistent, unless the estimation context is accounted for.
Many research extensions are warranted from this initial framework. For example, unlike what
is explicitly assumed in most available work, including ours, the social networks we live in are
not random, nor are they imposed by external forces (i.e., the random placement of agents on
the influence network). Rather, these social networks emerge under the influence of endogenous
social processes and gradually evolve within a potentially non-stationary context. Accordingly,
a truly context-dependent view on crowd wisdom should open connections with diverse research
fields and help advance an interdisciplinary understanding of the design of social systems and
their information outcomes.
Materials and Methods
Collective estimation and influence centralization, ω. We consider a group of n agents
indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, and assume that each agent is endowed with an independent and
identically distributed initial estimate ai,0. The distribution of the initial estimates, F θµ,σ, is
parametrized by the unknown truth, θ, the systematic bias, µ, and the dispersion, σ. In many
common models of social influence, the collective estimate, an, can be expressed as a convex
combination of the initial estimates: an(w¯) =
∑n
i=1wiai,0, where w1, . . . , wn are positive real
weights summing to one. These weights represent the influence of individual agents on shaping
the collective estimate. Without loss of generality, we assume that the agents are ordered in the
decreasing order of their influence, i.e., w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn. In order to investigate the role
of network centralization, 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, we consider a class of influence structures indexed by ω
9
such that (see SI section S1.1 for more details),
an(ω) = ωa1,0 + (1− ω) 1
n
n∑
i=1
ai,0.
Using ω, we interpolate between a dictatorial setup with a single influential voice (i.e., w1 =
ω = 1 and w2 = . . . = wn = 0) and a fully decentralized setup where everyone has an equal
voice (i.e., ω = 0 and w1 = w2 = . . . = wn = 1/n).
Proposed feature for the estimation context, Ω. We measure the probability that the col-
lective estimate produced by a centralized influence structure, an(ω), ω > 0, outperforms the
decentralized baseline, an(0). We denote this probability by Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) := Pθµ,σ[|an(ω)−θ| <
|an(0) − θ|]. To compute Ωn in Figure 2, we have fixed n = 50, θ = 2, and ω = 1/3. There-
fore, Ω is entirely determined by the distribution of the initial estimates (µ and σ). Similarly, in
Figure 3, we have fixed n = 50, θ = 2, and ω = 1/3, so that Ω is entirely determined by the
empirical distribution of the initial estimates. Figure S3 and Tables S2-S3 replicate our simula-
tion and empirical results for a range of n and ω values. For distributions F θµ,σ, supported over
positive reals, with cumulative function F θµ,σ, we propose the following lower bound (proved in
SI section S2.1):
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) ≥ sup
β>θ/(1−ω)
{
F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1)
}
.
In SI section S2.1, we show how to limit the rate of tail decay, for different classes of distri-
butions, to produce a non-trivial lower bound as n → ∞. For heavy-tailed distributions, such
as Pareto, log-Laplace, and log-normal (see SI subsections S2.1.1 to S2.1.3), we identify phase
transition behaviors, whereby the limiting value of the proposed lower bound transitions from
0 to 1 or 1/2 as σ crosses a critical value.
Statistical tests. All statistics were two-tailed and based on mixed-effects models that included
random effects to account for the nested structure of the data. In particular, the regression
equation for Figure 3.C is:
yij = β0 + β1Ω(j) + β2Ii + β3IiΩ(j) + vi + ij,
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where yij is the standardized (z-score) absolute error of the revised collective estimate for the
i-th group in the j-th estimation context; β0 is the fixed intercept for the regression model; β1 is
the fixed coefficient for the estimation context feature, Ω; Ii ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable of
whether or not social interaction has occurred; β2 is the fixed coefficient for the social influence
centralization; β3 is the fixed coefficient for the interaction term between the estimation context
feature, Ω, and influence centralization (shown in Figure 3.C); vi is the random coefficient for
the i-th group; and ij is a Gaussian error term.
The logistic regression equation for Figure 3.D is:
yij =
1
1 + exp(β0 + β1Ω(j) + vi + ij)
,
where yij is a binary indicator for whether or not the i-th group in the j-th estimation context
improved the accuracy of its collective estimate after social interaction; β0 is the fixed intercept
for the regression model; β1 is the fixed coefficient for the estimation context feature, Ω; vi is
the random coefficient for the i-th group; and ij is a Gaussian error term.
Further detail of the regression analysis is provided in SI section S3.1, Table S1. Robustness
checks for the regression results are presented in Tables S2-S3.
Data availability. Replication data and code are available at https://github.com/amaatouq/task-
dependence.
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Supplementary Information
This Supplementary Information is organized into five sections. In section S1, we present net-
work models of collective estimation that facilitate our study of the collective estimate, an(ω),
as a function of the centralization, ω, and in relation to its network structure. In section S2, we
give the proof of our main proposition and relate it to the rate of tail decay for many common
distributions. We study these relationships theoretically and through numerical analysis as well.
In section S3, we develop empirical measures to analyze prior experiments in terms of the fea-
tures of their estimation context. In section S4, we provide robustness checks. Supplementary
references are listed in section S5.
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Preliminary notation. For convenience of the reader, we collect here some notation that will be used throughout.
We study collective estimation by a group of agents and use n to denote the group size. For sequences of real num-
bers fn and gn, indexed by integers n, we use the asymptotic notations fn � gn to signify that limn→∞ fn/gn = 1.
We consider agents that are indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. We use bold fonts to represent random variables. We use
a1,0, . . ., an,0 to denote the individual estimates in the absence of any social interactions. The collective estimate
is denoted by an; it is determined in terms of the individual estimates, in a manner that involves a centralization
parameter ω: an(ω) = ωa1,0 + (1 − ω) 1n
�n
i=1 ai,0. Vectors are denoted by a bar on top of their letters and we
use superscript T to denote matrix transpose.
S1
S1 Network models of collective estimation
Let θ be an unknown state of the world. Consider n agents indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, each
endowed with a biased and noisy signal about θ. The signals are independent and identically
distributed across the agents and constitute their initial estimates of the unknown θ:
ai,0 ∼ Fθµ,σ. (S.1)
The the distribution of the initial estimates in (S.1), Fθµ,σ, is parametrized by θ, µ, and σ. We
think of µ as a location parameter (the center of the distribution) that biases the individual
estimates against θ. This captures the level of systematic bias in the population. We think of
σ as a variance-proxy/shape parameter that determines the variation and tail-fatness of Fθµ,σ.
In other words, σ can be interpreted as the amount of prior information a group has about the
quantity and represents the level of demonstrability of the estimation task.
The agents interact in a group. Their group interactions can be modeled in a variety of ways
leading to a group aggregate an(w¯) that is a convex combination of the initial estimates:
an(w¯) := w¯T a¯0 =
n�
i=1
wiai,0, (S.2)
where w¯ is an entry-wise non-negative vector satisfying w¯T1 = 1.
In general, different agents’ initial estimates will receive different weights in the collective
estimate. A common method of modeling group interactions is through DeGroot-style iterated
averaging, which has a long history in mathematical sociology and social psychology [1]. The
origins of iterated averaging models can be traced to French’s seminal work on “A Formal The-
ory of Social Power” [2], followed up by Harary’s investigation of the mathematical properties
of the averaging model, including the consensus criteria, and its relations to Markov chain the-
ory [3]. This model was further popularized by DeGroot’s seminal work [4] on linear opinion
pools and belief exchange dynamics. In a typical iterated averaging setup, an agent’s estimate
at time t is given by a weighted average of her neighboring estimates at time t− 1:
ai,t =
n�
j=1
Wijaj,t−1,
S2
In matrix notation, we have:
a¯t = W a¯t−1 = W ta¯0, (S.3)
where a¯t = (a1,t, a2,t, . . . , an,t)T and W = [Wij] is the matrix of weights. We refer to matrix
W as the social influence matrix. For a strongly connected social network withWii > 0 for all
i, the Perron-Frobenius theory [5, Theorems 1.5 and 1.7] implies that W has a simple positive
real eigenvalue equal to 1. Moreover, the left and right eigenspaces associated with the unit
eigenvalue are both one-dimensional with the corresponding eigenvectors w = (w1, . . . , wn)T
and 1 = (1, . . . , 1)T . The magnitude of any other eigenvalue of W is strictly less than 1;
therefore, we have:
lim
t→∞
a¯t = lim
t→∞
W ta¯0 = 1w¯
T a¯0 = 1a
n(w¯), (S.4)
which implies a consensus on the collective estimate (S.2).
In several experimental settings [6, 7, 8, 9], human participants get to revise their numerical
estimates a few times only, and the collective estimate is then calculated by averaging the revised
estimates. Let us denote the number of communication rounds in such a scenario by τ . Using
(S.3) to model the revision of the numerical estimates, we again arrive at a model that gives the
collective estimate as a convex combination of the initial estimates, an(w¯τ ) = w¯Tτ a¯0, where the
transposed vector of weights, w¯Tτ , is given by:
w¯Tτ =
1
n
1TW τ .
S1.1 ω: Parameterizing a class of networks by their centralization
Motivated by our interest in comparing the collective estimation performance of centralized and
decentralized networks, we focus our attention on a class of social influence network structures
for which the collective estimate can be written as follows:
an(ω) = ωa1,0 + (1− ω) 1
n
n�
i=1
ai,0, (S.5)
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where ω is a measure of influence centralization, with ω = 1 representing a fully centralized
social influence structure (w1 = 1, and w2 = . . . = wn = 0) and ω = 0 corresponding to a
fully decentralized social influence structure (w1 = . . . = wn = 1/n). Indeed, with w¯ as the
centrality vector, the parameter ω corresponds to the Freedman centralization of the underlying
network with social influence matrix W . By varying ω ∈ [0, 1], we can interpolate between
the two extremes: full centralization, ω = 1, and complete decentralization, ω = 0. This class,
although not encompassing, is ideal for addressing the central question of interest in this work.
The networks in this class are such that one agent, i = 1, is distinguished with a higher influence
and all others, i > 1, have an equal but lower influence. Networks in this class include cases
of practical and empirical interest, such as start networks and circular lattices. All networks in
Figure 1.B, in the main text, belong to this class.
Here, we consider the special cases of star and cycle networks with bidirectional edges, and
equal weights on all edges that are incoming to the same node. Their respective social influence
matrices and associated left eigenvectors are given by:
W� =

1/n 1/n 1/n · · · 1/n
1/2 1/2 0 · · · 0
1/2 0 1/2 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0
1/2 0 · · · 0 1/2

, Wo =

1/3 1/3 0 · · · 0 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3 0 . . . 0
0
. . .
. . . 0
...
0
. . . 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 . . . 0 1/3 1/3

,
w¯� = (n/(3n− 2), 2/(3n− 2), . . . , 2/(3n− 2))T , w¯o = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n)T .
Subsequently, the network centralization parameter ω in (S.5) for the star and cycle networks
are given by ω� = (n−2)/(3n−2) and ωo = 0. Note that as n→∞, ω� → 1/3. This, together
with the fact that experimental studies have used the star topology to test collective estimation
in centralized structures [7], motivates our choice of ω = 1/3 in our numerical simulations and
empirical analysis. In section S4, we show that our results are robust to this choice of ω.
S4
S1.2 Ω: A proposed feature for the estimation context
We consider a case where agents are randomly placed in the social influence network. This
is typical of many experimental setups [8, 7, 6]. Let Eθµ,σ be the expectation with respect to
the random draws of the n i.i.d. initial estimates, a1,0, . . . , an,0 ∼ Fθµ,σ, and let Pθµ,σ be the
corresponding probability measure. The expected mean square root error, mean absolute error,
and mean squared error of the collective estimate are given by:
MSREn(w¯,F θµ,σ) := Eθµ,σ
�
|an(w¯)− θ|1/2
�
,
MAEn(w¯,F θµ,σ) := Eθµ,σ [|an(w¯)− θ|] ,
MSEn(w¯,F θµ,σ) := Eθµ,σ
�
(an(w¯)− θ)2� .
In order to investigate the interaction between the network structure and the distribution of
the initial estimates, (i.e. the estimation context: a population of agents performing a particular
estimation task), we propose the following measure of how the collective estimate an(w¯) =
w¯T a¯0 performs against a fully decentralized aggregate an(0):
Ωn(w,Fθµ,σ) := Pθµ,σ[|an(w¯)− θ| < |an(0)− θ|],
where w is the centrality vector in (S.4). Restricting attention to the class of networks in sub-
section S1.1, with an(ω) = ωa1,0 + (1− ω) 1n
�n
i=1 ai,0, we can write:
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) = Pθµ,σ[|an(ω)− θ| < |an(0)− θ|].
This measure, Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ), corresponds to the probability that a network with social influence
centralization ω > 0 outperforms a decentralized network with ω = 0, in absolute error perfor-
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mance. Similarly, for other performance measures, we can write:
MSREn(ω,F θµ,σ) := Eθµ,σ
�
|an(ω)− θ|1/2
�
, (S.6)
MAEn(ω,F θµ,σ) := Eθµ,σ [|an(ω)− θ|] ,
MSEn(ω,F θµ,σ) := Eθµ,σ
�
(an(ω)− θ)2� .
Our focus throughout the paper will be on Ωn, which we propose as a critical feature of the
estimation context, to capture its suitability to benefit from centralization.
In section S2, we present a theoretical and numerical analysis of the properties of our pro-
posed feature, Ωn. In particular, we show how the behavior of Ωn varies with the estimation
context, i.e. the distribution of the initial estimates. In section S2.1, we present a theoretical
lower bound on Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) and analyze its behavior for various classes of distributions, Fθµ,σ.
In section S2.2, we supplement these findings by numerical analysis and simulations.
In section S3, we demonstrate the explanatory power of Ωn in determining how and when
social influence improves the collective estimation accuracy in prior empirical studies. In par-
ticular, in experimental conditions with no social interactions, an external observers polls each
of the participants for their opinions. Therefore, in the absence of social influence, the aggre-
gate is given by an(0) = (1/n)
�n
i=1 ai,0, which is equivalent to a fully decentralized influence
structure. On the other hand, in the presence of social influence, the participants revise their
estimates as a result of their social interactions, thus leading to an aggregate that is a weighted
average of the initial estimate, an(w¯) =
�n
i=1wiai,0. Hence, social interaction leads to a col-
lective estimate that is less decentralized. In our model, we capture this case by an(ω),ω > 0.
We present our empirical results in the main text for ω = 1/3 and n = 50. In section S4 we
show that our results are robust to our choices of ω and n.
Our proposed feature of the estimation context, Ωn, is concerned only with the probability
of the following event: the collective estimate generated by the agents interacting in a central-
ized influence structure will be closer to the truth than the collective estimate generated by the
agents in a decentralized structure. This is not the same as comparing the expected loss or error
magnitudes. In section S4, Figure S4, we show the results for various loss function choices.
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S2 Theoretical analysis of Ω
In this section, we first propose a lower bound on Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) in subsection S2.1, followed
by analyses of its behavior for different distributions in five sub-subsections: these are the
Pareto, S2.1.1, log-Laplace, S2.1.2, log-normal, S2.1.3, other heavy-tailed, S2.1.4, and thin-
tailed distributions, S2.1.5. In subsection S2.2, we describe the procedure for direct numerical
simulations of Ω for these various classes and offer additional numerical insights.
S2.1 The main proposition
Motivated by empirical literature that pose estimation questions to human participants, we focus
on 0 < θ and distributions F θµ,σ with support over positive reals. Fix 0 < θ, 0 < ω < 1,
θ/(1 − ω) < β, and consider the event E1 = {a1,0 < β}. Note that for many distributions
we can make Pθµ,σ(E1) arbitrarily close to one by taking β large enough. Next consider the
event En = {an(0) > β + a1,0/n}. Note that En implies an(0) > β; furthermore E1 and En are
independent events. On the other hand, conditioned on the events E1 and En, we have:
|an(ω)− θ| = |ωa1,0 + (1− ω)an(0)− θ| < ωa1,0 + |(1− ω)an(0)− θ|
< ωβ + |(1− ω)an(0)− θ|
= ωβ + (1− ω)an(0)− θ < ωan(0) + (1− ω)an(0)− θ = |an(0)− θ| ,
where in the second line we have used β > a1,0, and in the third line we have used an(0) > β
and (1 − ω)an(0) > (1 − ω)β > θ. Hence, conditioned on E1 ∩ En, we have |an(ω)− θ| <
|an(0)− θ|, i.e., centralized networks outperform decentralized ones. We can thus bound
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ), the probability that a social influence network with centralization ω outperforms a
decentralized one (ω = 0) in absolute error measure:
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) ≥ Pθµ,σ[E1 ∩ En] = Pθµ,σ[E1]Pθµ,σ[En]. (S.7)
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Denoting the cumulative distribution F θµ,σ(x) := Pθµ,σ[a1,0 ≤ x] and the tail probability F¯ θµ,σ(x) :=
Pθµ,σ[a1,0 > x], we can write Pθµ,σ[E1] = Pθµ,σ[a1,0 ≤ β] = F θµ,σ(β), and
Pθµ,σ[En] = Pθµ,σ[
�n
2 ai,0 > nβ ] ≥ Pθµ,σ[ max2,...,n ai,0 > nβ ] = 1− F
θ
µ,σ(nβ)
n−1. (S.8)
Using Pθµ,σ[E1]Pθµ,σ[En] ≥ F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1), together with (S.7), we arrive at our main
proposition:
Proposition. Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) ≥ sup
β>θ/(1−ω)
�
F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1)
�
.
To proceed, let us denote the lower bound:
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) := sup
β>θ/(1−ω)
�
F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1)
�
. (S.9)
Some observations are now in order regarding the behavior of the lower bound, Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ).
First note that Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) is decreasing in θ and ω. Secondly, the asymptotic behavior of
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ), as n→∞, is determined by F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1. Note that F θµ,σ(nβ) ≤ 1 and F θµ,σ(β)→
1 as n → ∞ for any β > 0. Therefore, if F θµ,σ(nβ) → 1 at a slow enough rate such that
F θµ,σ(nβ)
n−1 is bounded away from one for all n, then F θµ,σ(β)(1 − F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1) is bounded
away from zero as n→∞. Subsequently, for various classes of distributions with slow enough
tail decay, we can establish nontrivial lower bounds Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) > 0.
In subsections S2.1.1 to S2.1.3, we give conditions on the estimation context, i.e., the dis-
tribution of the initial estimates (parameterized by µ, σ, and θ), of well-known heavy-tailed
distributions such that Ωn,Ωn → 1 as n → ∞. In subsection S2.1.4, we discuss the general
properties of heavy-tailed distributions that make them relevant to our proposition. Finally, in
subsection S2.1.5 we present countervailing arguments for thin-tailed distributions.
S2.1.1 Pareto (power-law)
Pareto or power-law distributions are archetypal, heavy-tailed distributions characterized by
their polynomial tail decay. Consider a Pareto distribution with location parameter θeµ and
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shape parameter σ, defined as follows:
F¯ θµ,σ(x) = (θe
µ/x)1/σ , for x ≥ θeµ. (S.10)
For Pareto distributions we have:
F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1) =
�
1−
�
θeµ
β
�1/σ�1−�1− �θeµ
nβ
�1/σ�n−1
�
�
1−
�
θeµ
β
�1/σ��
1− e−n(θeµ/nβ)1/σ
�
, (S.11)
where we used the n→∞ asymptotic equality
e−n(θe
µ/nβ)1/σ �
�
1−
�
θeµ
nβ
�1/σ�n−1
. (S.12)
We now consider the three distinct n → ∞ limiting behavior that arise for σ > 1, σ = 1, and
σ < 1:
• For σ > 1, as n→∞ we get
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) ≥ 1− (θeµ/β)1/σ for all β > θ/(1− ω),
and letting β →∞ we conclude that
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) � Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) � 1, for σ > 1, and any 0 < θ, 0 < ω < 1, and real µ.
• Replacing σ = 1 in (S.11), the lower bound Ωn(ω,F θµ,1) can be calculated as follow:
sup
β>θ/(1−ω)
�
1− θe
µ
β
− e−θeµ/β + θe
µ
β
e−θe
µ/β
�
=
 W0(e
2) + 1/W0(e
2)− 2 ≈ 0.199, if µ ≥ log
�
2−W0(e2)
1−ω
�
,
1− eµ(1− ω)− e−eµ(1−ω) + eµ(1− ω)e−eµ(1−ω), if µ < log
�
2−W0(e2)
1−ω
�
.
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To see why, denote x = θeµ/β. The maximum of 1−x−e−x+xe−x occurs at x� satisfying
−1 + 2e−x� − x�e−x� = 0. The latter has a unique solution over the positive reals given
by x� = 2 −W0(e2) ≈ 0.443, where W0 is the principal branch Lambert W function,
uniquely satisfying W0(e2)eW0(e
2) = e2 on positive reals. Replacing x = 2 − W0(e2)
in 1 − x − e−x + xe−x gives the maximum value W0(e2) + 1/W0(e2) − 2 realized at
β = θeµ/(2 −W0(e2)) if eµ ≥ (2 −W0(e2))/(1 − ω). If eµ < (2 −W0(e2))/(1 − ω),
then the supremum is achieved with β = θ/(1 − ω) at a value that is strictly less than
W0(e
2) + 1/W0(e
2)− 2 ≈ 0.199.
• For σ < 1, as n→∞ we get�
1−
�
θeµ
β
�1/σ��
1− e−n(θeµ/nβ)1/σ
�
→ 0.
for any β.
We thus obtain the following asymptotic characterization of the lower bound for Pareto distri-
butions (indicating a phase transition at σ = 1):
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) �

0, if σ < 1,
(1− eµ(1− ω))(1− e−eµ(1−ω)), if σ = 1 and µ < log
�
2−W0(e2)
1−ω
�
,
W0(e
2) + 1/W0(e
2)− 2 ≈ 0.199, if σ = 1 and µ ≥ log
�
2−W0(e2)
1−ω
�
,
1, if σ > 1.
(S.13)
In Figure S1.A, top, we have plotted (S.13) for ω = 1/3, θ = 2, and n = 50. Comparing
with the direct numerical simulation in Figure S1.A, bottom, shows how the bound gets tighter
for large σ.
S2.1.2 Log-Laplace
Jayles et al. [10] point out that log-Laplace provides a better fit to the empirically measured
distribution of the initial estimates, compared to log-Cauchy [11], or log-normal. Here, we
analyze the asymptotic behavior of the proposed lower bound as n → ∞, when the initial
estimates are distributed according to a log-Laplace distribution with parameters log θ + µ and
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σ:
F θµ,σ(x) =

1
2
exp
�
log(x/θ)−µ
σ
�
, if log(x/θ) < µ,
1− 1
2
exp
�
µ−log(x/θ)
σ
�
, if log(x/θ) ≥ µ.
(S.14)
For n large enough, we have log(nβ/θ) ≥ µ, and using the same asymptotics as in (S.12) we
get:
F θµ,σ(nβ)
n−1 =
�
1− 1
2
exp
�
µ− log(nβ/θ)
σ
��n−1
=
�
1−
�
1
n
�1/σ
exp
�
µ+ log θ − log β
σ
− log(2)
��n−1
� exp
�
−n
�
1
n
�1/σ
exp
�
µ+ log θ − log β
σ
− log(2)
��
�

1, if σ < 1,
exp
�
−eµθ
2β
�
, if σ = 1,
0, if σ > 1.
Subsequently, for σ < 1 we have F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1) � 0, for any β. On the other hand,
for σ > 1 we have F θµ,σ(β)(1 − F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1) � F θµ,σ(β), which is increasing in β and goes to
one as β increases to∞. Hence,
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) = sup
β>θ/(1−ω)
�
F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1)
� � 1, for σ > 1.
Finally, for σ = 1, we have:
F θµ,1(β)(1− F θµ,1(nβ)n−1) �

�
1− exp
�
−eµθ
2β
��
β
2θeµ
, if β
eµθ
< 1,�
1− exp
�
−eµθ
2β
���
1− eµθ
2β
�
, if β
eµθ
≥ 1.
S11
Optimizing β gives:
Ωn(ω,F θµ,1) �

1−1/√e
2
≈ 0.1967, if µ ≥ − log(1− ω),�
1− e−eµ(1−ω)/2� (1− eµ(1− ω)/2) < 1−1/√e
2
, if µ < − log(1− ω).
We summarize the above results in the following asymptotic characterization of the lower
bound for log-Laplace distributions, with a phase transition at σ = 1:
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) �

0, if σ < 1,�
1− e−eµ(1−ω)/2� (1− eµ(1− ω)/2) , if σ = 1 and µ < − log(1− ω),
1−1/√e
2
≈ 0.1967, if σ = 1 and µ ≥ − log(1− ω),
1, if σ > 1.
(S.15)
In Figure S1.B, top, we have plotted (S.15) for ω = 1/3, θ = 2, and n = 50. Comparing
with the direct numerical simulation in Figure S1.B, bottom, shows how the bound gets tighter
for large σ.
S2.1.3 Log-normal
Several empirical studies report a log-normal distribution for the initial estimates [7, 8, 12].
Here, we analyze the case where the initial estimates are distributed according to a log-normal
distribution with parameters log θ + µ and σ:
F θµ,σ(x) = Φ
�
log(x/θ)− µ
σ
�
, x > 0, (S.16)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution. We next apply the following control over the
Gaussian tail:
1− 1√
2πt
e−t
2/2 ≤ Φ(t) ≤ 1− t√
2π(t2 + 1)
e−t
2/2
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to obtain:�
1− σ√
2π(log(nβ/θ)− µ) exp
�
−(log(nβ/θ)− µ)
2
2σ2
��n−1
≤ F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1
≤
�
1− (log(nβ/θ)− µ)σ√
2π((log(nβ/θ)− µ)2 + σ2) exp
�
−(log(nβ/θ)− µ)
2
2σ2
��n−1
. (S.17)
We next choose σ = σn, with β and θ, fixed such that (log(nβ/θ) − µ)/σn → ∞ as n → ∞.
Taking the limit n→∞, with σ = σn in (S.17), we get:
F θµ,σn(nβ)
n−1 (S.18)
� exp
�
− nσn√
2π log n
exp
�
− (log(nβ/θ)− µ)
2
2σ2n
��
= exp
�
− 1√
2π log n
exp
�
log n+ log σn − (log(nβ/θ)− µ)
2
2σ2n
��
Focusing on the second exponent, we obtain :
fn := log n+ log σn − (log(nβ/θ)− µ)
2
2σ2n
(S.19)
= log n+ log σn − log(nβ/θ)
2
2σ2n
− µ
2
2σ2n
+
µ log(nβ/θ)
σ2n
= log n+ log σn − (log n)
2
2σ2n
− log(β/θ) log n
σ2n
− log(β/θ)
2
2σ2n
− µ
2
2σ2n
+
µ log(nβ/θ)
σ2n
.
Setting σn =
�
log n/kn in (S.19) yields:
fn = (1− kn/2) log n+ (1/2) log log n+ (µ− log(β/θ)) kn − (1/2) log kn
+ (−(1/2) log(β/θ)2 − µ2/2 + µ log(β/θ)) kn
log n
�

(2−kn)
2
log n, if kn < 2,
(1/2) log log n, if kn = 2,
(2−kn)
2
log n, if kn > 2.
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Finally, substituting in (S.18), we get:
F θµ,σn(nβ)
n−1 � exp
�
− efn/(
√
2π log n)
�
�
 0, if σn >
�
log n/2,
1, if σn ≤
�
log n/2.
The latter together with the fact that F θµ,σn(β) = Φ ((log(β/θ)− µ)/σn) � Φ(0) = 1/2, for
σn >
�
log n/2, leads to the following asymptotic characterization for log-normal distributions
(indicating a phase transition at σn =
�
log n/2):
F θµ,σn(β)(1− F θµ,σn(nβ)n−1) �
 0, if σn ≤
�
log n/2,
1/2, if σn >
�
log n/2,
which is true for all β, and in particular yields:
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) = sup
β>θ/(1−ω)
�
F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1)
�
�
 0, if σn ≤
�
log n/2,
1/2, if σn >
�
log n/2.
(S.20)
In Figure S1.C, top, we have plotted (S.20) for ω = 1/3, θ = 2, and n = 50. Comparing
with the result of the direct numerical simulation, Figure S1.C, bottom, shows how the bound
gets tighter for larger σ.
S2.1.4 Other heavy-tailed distributions
Many empirical studies [8, 11, 12, 13, 14] point out a heavy-tailed distribution for the numer-
ical estimates (with a few estimates that fall on a fat right tail). Following the proof of the
main proposition, we pointed out that for heavy-tailed distributions where F¯ θµ,σ(nβ) decreases
slowly, we can provide non-trivial lower bounds on Ωn that remain bounded away from zero,
Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) > 0, even as n → ∞. In fact, if F¯ θµ,σ(nβ) decreases at a rate that is slower than
1/n, i.e., nF¯ θµ,σ(nβ) → ∞, then F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1 → 0 as n → ∞. For such slowly decaying tails,
the supremum in (S.9) is achieved as β →∞, and we can guarantee that Ωn � Ωn � 1; hence,
the proposed lower bound is asymptotically tight.
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Here, we identify a second way, in which, our proposed lower bound is tighter for heavy-
tailed distributions. To this end, let us revisit (S.8) — a critical step in deriving the proposed
lower bound:
Pθµ,σ[En] = Pθµ,σ[
�n
i=2 ai,0 > nβ ] > P
θ
µ,σ[ max
2,...,n
ai,0 > nβ ].
This inequality is at the heart of the so-called “catastrophe principle” [15, Chapter 3] that applies
to many heavy-tailed distributions. Intuitively, this principle entails that when one observes a
larger than expected average value for a collection of heavy-tailed random variables, then this
observation is most likely explained by the existence of a very large sample in the collection,
i.e. a “catastrophe”. On the other hand, the countervailing explanation in the case of light-
tailed random variables is that “most” of the samples in the collection happen to be larger than
expected. Formally, the distribution Fθµ,σ of the initial estimates is said to satisfy the catastrophe
principle [15, Definition 3.1], if for any n:
lim
t→∞
Pθµ,σ[ max
1,...,n
ai,0 > t ]
Pθµ,σ[
�n
i=1 ai,0 > t ]
= 1.
The preceding condition is equivalent to having:
lim
t→∞
nPθµ,σ[a1,0 > t]
Pθµ,σ[
�n
i=1 ai,0 > t]
= 1, for all n ≥ 2.
The latter is the defining property for the subexponential family of distributions, which include
many common classes of heavy-tailed distributions such as those considered in subsections
S2.1.1 to S2.1.3. Setting t = nβ and letting n → ∞, we obtain that if F θµ,σ is a member of the
subexponential family, then
Pθµ,σ[En] = Pθµ,σ[
�n
i=2 ai,0 > nβ ] � Pθµ,σ[ max2,...,n ai,0 > nβ ].
Hence, for such distributions belonging to the subexponential family our proposed lower bound
is asymptotically tight in as much as Pθµ,σ[E1 ∩ En] � F θµ,σ(β)(1 − F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1), and the only
way in which our lower bound may be loose is through (S.7), i.e. if Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) > Pθµ,σ[E1∩En]
for all β > θ/(1− ω) as n→∞.
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It is worth noting that many light-tailed distributions portray an opposite picture, referred to
as “conspiracy principle” in [15, Definition 3.2]; formally defined as follows:
lim
t→∞
Pθµ,σ[ max
1,...,n
ai,0 > t ]
Pθµ,σ[
�n
i=1 ai,0 > t]
= 0, for all n ≥ 2.
As an example, suppose that the initial estimates are exponentially distributed with mean θeµ
and the following tail probability:
F¯ θµ,σ(x) = e
−x/θeµ , x > 0.
Then their sum follows an Erlang distribution, satisfying:
Pθµ,σ[
�n
2 ai,0 > nβ ] =
n−2�
k=0
e−nβ/(θe
µ)
k!
�
nβ
θeµ
�k
,
such that
Pθµ,σ[ max
2,...,n
ai,0 > nβ ] � (n− 1)Pθµ,σ[ a1,0 > nβ ] = (n− 1)e−nβ/(θe
µ)
�
n−2�
k=0
e−nβ/(θe
µ)
k!
�
nβ
θeµ
�k
= Pθµ,σ[
�n
i=2 ai,0 > nβ ].
and
Pθµ,σ[ max
2,...,n
ai,0 > nβ ]
Pθµ,σ[
�n
i=2 ai,0 > nβ ]
� 0.
S2.1.5 Distributions with strong tail decay
It is instructive to investigate the behavior of the lower bound for light-tailed distributions as
well. Sub-Gaussian distributions are a class of probability distribution with strong tail decay (at
least as fast as a Gaussian). Suppose x is a random variable with mean µ + θ and cumulative
distribution F θµ,σ. Furthermore, suppose that x − µ − θ is sub-Gaussain with variance-proxy
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parameter σ, thereby, satisfying:
F¯ θµ,σ(nβ) = Pθµ,σ[x > nβ] ≤ e−(nβ−µ−θ)
2/2σ2
On the other hand, we have (1 + F θµ,σ(nβ) + F
θ
µ,σ(nβ)
2 + . . .+ F θµ,σ(nβ)
n−2) ≤ n− 1, which
we can combine with the above to get that
F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ)n−1)
= F θµ,σ(β)(1− F θµ,σ(nβ))(1 + F θµ,σ(nβ) + F θµ,σ(nβ)2 + . . .+ F θµ,σ(nβ)n−2)
≤ nF θµ,σ(β) exp
�
−(nβ − µ− θ)
2
2σ2
�
→ 0, as n→∞, for any β > 0.
Therefore, there are no set of parameters µ and σ that lead to a non-trivial, asymptotic lower
bound on Ωn for random variables with sub-Gaussian tails: Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) � 0, for all θ, µ, σ. As
an example, consider the folded Gaussian distribution, which is defined as the absolute value of
a normally distributed random variable with mean θeµ and variance σ:
F θµ,σ(x) = Φ
�
x− θeµ
σ
�
+ Φ
�
x+ θeµ
σ
�
− 1, x > 0, (S.21)
whereΦ is the standard normal distribution. In Figure S1.D, bottom, we have plottedΩn(ω,F θµ,σ)
with ω = 1/3, θ = 2, n = 50, and initial estimates following a folded-Gaussian distribution.
There are no range of distribution parameters, µ and σ, for which Ωn increases above 0.6. In-
deed, for such light-tailed distributions, admitting finite first and second moments, we can show
that the limiting expected absolute error of the collective estimate with centralization ω, an(ω),
is higher than the decentralized baseline, an(0).
Consider the case whereFθµ,σ admits the following finite first and secondmoments: Eθµ,σ[a1,0] =
θeµ, and Eθµ,σ[a21,0] = θ2e2µ + σ2. Then an(0) → θeµ, and an(ω) → ωa1,0 + (1 − ω)θeµ, both
almost surely, as n→∞. Hence,
Eθµ,σ[|an(ω)− θ|] > |Eθµ,σ[an(ω)− θ]| = |θ(1− eµ)| � Eθµ,σ[|an(0)− θ|].
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We can repeat the same calculations for the expected mean squared errors as well:
Eθµ,σ[(an(0)− θ)2]→ θ2(1− eµ)2, and
Eθµ,σ[(an(ω)− θ)2]→ θ2(1− eµ)2 + ω2σ2 > θ2(1− eµ)2 � Eθµ,σ[(an(0)− θ)2].
For distributions with light tails decentralized networks outperform centralized ones, in expec-
tation for absolute and squared errors, for any choice of parameters µ and σ. This verifies
the classical accounts of the wisdom of crowds, whereby the law of large numbers guaran-
tees almost sure convergence of the collective estimate for structures with vanishing individual
influences [16, Proposition 2].
S2.2 Numerical simulations
For numerical simulations, we have fixed θ = 2, ω = 1/3, and n = 50. The choice of
ω = 1/3 is arbitrary and our conclusions remain valid for ω > 0, as verified by the robustness
checks in section S4. This choice is motivated by our observation in subsection S1.1 that ω
for a star network converges to 1/3 as n → ∞. This also allows us to juxtapose our simula-
tions with common experimental setups that use the star topology as archetypal of centralized
structures [7].
Note that with ω = 1/3 fixed, the dependence of Ωn on the network structure is removed.
Therefore, Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) is entirely determined by the distribution of the initial estimates, F θµ,σ,
i.e. the estimation context. Here, we study our proposed task feature, Ωn, numerically for a
palette of empirically relevant distributions.
For any distribution of the initial estimates, F θµ,σ, and number of agents, n, we calculate
Ωn using a Monte Carlo method. We sample n initial estimates and calculate the collective
estimates, an(1/3) and an(0), using equation (S.5). If an(1/3) is closer to the truth, θ, than
an(0), implying that a centralized network performed better than a decentralized network, then
we add to our tally of Ωn. We repeat this procedure N times, where N is large enough to allow
for the value of Ωn to converge (see the simulation procedure 1). The results in Figure S1 are
obtained in this manner with θ = 2, n = 50, and N = 10, 000 for four different distributions:
Pareto (S.10), log-Laplace (S.14), log-normal (S.16), and folded-Gaussian (S.21).
S18
Procedure 1: Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) computation
Input: Fθ(µ, σ), n, ω, N
Output: Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ)
Initialize Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) = 0.
for j = 1 : N do
Sample a1,0, . . ., an,0 ∼ Fθ(µ, σ).
Compute an(0) and an(ω) according to (S.5).
if |an(ω)− θ| < |an(0)− θ| then
Update Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) = Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) + 1/N .
end
end
Decentralized better Centralized better
Log-LaplacePareto Log-normal Folded GaussianA B C D
Figure S1: Simulating the lower bound Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ) and the actual value Ωn(ω,F θµ,σ), under
different distributions for the initial estimates: Pareto (S.10), log-Laplace (S.14), log-normal
(S.16), and folded Gaussian (S.21). In all the plots, we have fixed ω = 1/3, θ = 2, and n = 50.
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S2.2.1 The effect of the systematic bias, µ
To see the effect of the log-normal distribution parameters, µ and σ, in a different light, it is
instructive to study the behavior of the median of the random variable an(ω). In particular, we
are interested in the location of Median[an(ω)] with respect to the truth θ, as the distribution
parameter µ is varied. We do so in the limit of large group sizes, n → ∞. Note that since
log-normal distributions have finite moments, the strong law of large numbers applies. Hence,
as n→∞, an(0) converges almost surely to
E[ai,0] = exp(log θ + µ+ σ2/2)
In particular we also have that
lim
n→∞
Median[an(0)] = exp(log θ + µ+ σ2/2).
On the other hand, note that for ω > 0, an(ω) = ωa1,0 + (1 − ω)an(0). Hence, as n → ∞,
an(ω)→ ωa1,0 + exp(log θ + µ+ σ2/2), almost surely. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
Median[an(ω)] = ω Median[ai,0] + (1− ω) exp(log θ + µ+ σ2/2)
= ω exp(log θ + µ) + (1− ω) exp(log θ + µ+ σ2/2),
where we have used the fact that Median[ai,0] = exp(log θ + µ). Next, we note that depending
on where the distributional parameters, θ, σ, and µ, are located, three cases may arise:
• If exp(log θ+µ+σ2/2) < θ, or equivalently, µ < −σ2/2, then limn→∞ Median[an(ω)] <
limn→∞ Median[an(0)] < θ. In this case, as n→∞, at least half of the time, an(0) falls
closer to θ than an(ω), hence, limn→∞Ωn < 1/2; see Figure S2.A.
• If exp(log θ + µ) < θ < exp(log θ + µ + σ2/2), or equivalently, −σ2/2 < µ < 0, then
limn→∞ Median[an(ω)] < θ < limn→∞ Median[an(0)]. In this case, the limiting value
of Ωn may be less then, or greater than, but is close to 1/2; see Figure S2.B.
• If θ < exp(log θ+µ+σ2/2), or equivalently, 0 < µ, then θ < limn→∞ Median[an(ω)] <
limn→∞ Median[an(0)]. In this case, as n → ∞, at least half of the time, an(ω) falls
closer to θ than an(0), hence, limn→∞Ωn > 1/2; see Figure S2.C.
S20
θ median of an(ω) median of an(0)
µ = − 0.4, σ = 1, θ = 2B µ = 0.1, σ = 1, θ = 2CA µ = − 1, σ = 1, θ = 2
Figure S2: Simulating the medians of an(ω) and an(0) for three different values of the system-
atic bias, µ. The median of an(ω) is always less than an(0) for the distributions studied here,
and in this framing there are three different qualitative levels of bias: panel A, when the distri-
bution of initial estimates significantly under-estimates the truth, µ < −σ2/2, then the median
of an(0) is closer to the truth, θ, than the median of an(ω), in this case, Ωn < 1/2; panel B,
when the distribution of initial estimates slightly under-estimates the truth, −σ2/2 < µ < 0,
then the truth lies between the medians of an(ω) and an(0), and Ω ≈ 0.5; panel C, when
the distribution of initial estimates over-estimates the truth, µ > 0, then the median an(ω) is
closer to the truth, leading to Ωn > 1/2. In these simulations, we have fixed ω = 1/3, θ = 2,
n = 50, and N = 10, 000, where N is the number of samples used to simulate the median
values numerically.
Finally, it is worth noting that a similar argument applies to any right-skewed and heavy-
tailed distribution, for which the population mean exists and is greater than the population
median.
S3 Empirical analysis of estimation contexts in prior work
To empirically illustrate the explanatory power of this theory, we use data from four published
experiments [8, 17, 7, 6], in which 4, 002 participants organized into 131 independent groups
completed a total of 57 estimation tasks generating 20, 030 individual estimations and 815 col-
lective estimations. Each task induces a different distribution on the initial estimates that are
measured empirically. Therefore, each task constitutes an estimation context in our framework
and we have a total of 57 estimation contexts. We calculate Ω directly from the data based on
the empirical initial estimates without the need for making any distributional assumptions—i.e.,
sampling initial estimates with replacement from the data. The computational procedure is as
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follows:
Procedure 2: Ωn(ω, experimental task) computation
Input: experimental initial estimates, n, ω, N
Output: Ωn(ω, experimental task)
Initialize Ωn(ω, experimental task) = 0.
for j = 1 : N do
Sample a1,0, . . ., an,0 with replacement from the experimental initial estimates.
Compute an(0) and an(ω) according to (S.5).
if |an(ω)− θ| < |an(0)− θ| then
Update Ωn(experimental task) = Ωn(experimental task) + 1/N .
end
end
S3.1 Regression Analysis
Our main empirical analyses, shown in Figure 3 and Table S1, are based on a mixed effect
model with a random effect to account for the nested structure of the data.
In particular, the regression equation for Figure 3.C (Table S1, Model 1) is:
yij = β0 + β1Ω(j) + β2Ii + β3IiΩ(j) + vi + �ij, (Model 1)
where yij is the standardized (z-score) absolute error of the revised collective estimate for the
i-th group in the j-th estimation context, β0 is the fixed intercept for the regression model, β1
is the fixed coefficient for our proposed feature of the estimation context, Ii ∈ {0, 1} is an
indicator variable of whether social interaction has occurred or not, β2 is the fixed coefficient
for the social influence centralization, β3 is the fixed coefficient for the interaction term between
our proposed feature of the estimation context and influence centralization, and vi is the random
coefficient for the i-th group. Finally, �ij is a Gaussian error term.
The logistic regression equation for Figure 3.D (Table S1, Model 2) is:
yij =
1
1 + exp(β0 + β1Ω(j) + vi + �ij)
, (Model 2)
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where yij is a binary indicator of whether the i-th group on the j-th task improved its collective
estimate after social interaction, β0 is the fixed intercept, β1 is the fixed coefficient for our
proposed feature of the estimation context, vi is the random coefficient for the i-th group, and
�ij is a Gaussian error term.
Table S1: The main effects of our proposed feature, Ω, and its interaction with social influence
(i.e., centralization). Each datapoint is an experimental trial. The results are from a mixed effect
model with a random effect for the group. Note that Ω is computed for a fixed number of agents
(n = 50) and centralization level (ω = 1/3). See Tables S2-S3 for robustness to these choices.
Dependent variable:
Standardized Absolute Error Improved after social interaction
linear generalized linear
mixed-effects mixed-effects
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Estimation context feature Ω 3.359∗∗∗ 2.708∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.478)
Social Influence ∈ {0,1} 2.026∗∗∗
(0.343)
Ω x Social Influence −3.882∗∗∗
(0.539)
Intercept −1.772∗∗∗ −1.334∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.293)
Observations 815 678
Log Likelihood −1,097.161 −447.346
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,206.323 900.692
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,234.542 914.249
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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S4 Robustness checks
Incresing the num
ber of agents, n
Increasing the centerlization, 
Figure S3: Robustness checks of the simulation results by varying ω and n when calculating
our proposed feature of the estimation context, Ω, for the log-normal distribution. We find that
the qualitative behavior of the phase diagram is robust to these changes. Increasing n or ω leads
to sharper transitions from low Ω to high Ω.
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Table S2: Robustness checks for Model 1 (by varying ω and n when calculating our proposed
feature of the estimation context, Ω, from the empirical data) for the marginal effect of the
interaction term between the centralization of influence and the estimation context feature on
group performance—in terms of standardized absolute error. Each datapoint is an experimental
trial. The results are from a mixed effect model with a random effect for the group. We find that
the nature of the results is robust to alternative parameter choices.
Dependent variable:
Standardized Absolute Error
ω = 0.1, n = 5 ω = 1/3, n = 50 ω = 1, n = 35
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation context feature Ω 6.321∗∗∗ 3.046∗∗∗ 2.742∗∗∗
(1.256) (0.460) (0.413)
Social Influence ∈ {0, 1} 3.666∗∗∗ 1.882∗∗∗ 1.315∗∗∗
(0.743) (0.325) (0.251)
Ω x Social Influence −7.351∗∗∗ −3.538∗∗∗ −3.168∗∗∗
(1.349) (0.492) (0.442)
Intercept −3.170∗∗∗ −1.638∗∗∗ −1.154∗∗∗
(0.692) (0.302) (0.233)
Observations 815 815 815
Log Likelihood −1,105.754 −1,097.441 −1,097.743
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,223.507 2,206.882 2,207.486
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,251.726 2,235.101 2,235.705
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table S3: Robustness checks for Model 2 (by varying ω and n when calculating our proposed
feature of the estimation context, Ω, from the empirical data) for the effect of the estimation
context feature on the group performance after social interaction. Each datapoint is an experi-
mental trial. The results are from a mixed effect model with a random effect for the group. We
find that the nature of the results is robust to alternative parameter choices.
Dependent variable:
Whether the group improved after social interaction
ω = 0.1, n = 5 ω = 1/3, n = 50 ω = 1, n = 35
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation context feature Ω 5.601∗∗∗ 2.521∗∗∗ 1.993∗∗∗
(1.173) (0.439) (0.391)
Intercept −2.759∗∗∗ −1.264∗∗∗ −0.743∗∗∗
(0.635) (0.277) (0.215)
Observations 678 678 678
Log Likelihood −452.745 −446.900 −450.914
Akaike Inf. Crit. 911.490 899.799 907.829
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 925.047 913.356 921.386
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure S4: Panel A shows the loss as a function of error for the Mean Squared Error (MSE),
Mean Absolute Error (MAE), and the Mean Square Root Error (MSRE) loss functions — see
(S.6). Panels B, C, and D show the three loss functions for different values of µ and σ for a log-
normal distribution. In each case, we plot the ratio of the loss function evaluated in a centralized
structure, ω > 0, over a decentralized structure ω = 0. A ratio less than 1 indicates that the
centralized network performs better than the decentralized network. The performance of the
two influence structures can vary significantly as a function of the selected loss function [18].
The choice of the loss function is typically application-dependent. For instance, if the reward
for ‘getting it right’ is greater than the cost of being frequently wrong (Panel D)—as in domains
where the loss and payoff are asymmetric, unbounded, or have a remote boundary [19, 20, 13]—
then the decentralized influence structure is more desirable when the dispersion is high. The
initial estimates in these simulations are sampled from a log-normal distribution for a fixed
number of agents (n = 50) and centralization level (ω = 1/3).
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